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A LETTER TO The Rev. Dr. THOMAS LELAND,

Fellow of TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN:

IN WHICH

His late DISSERTATION *on the Principles of Human Eloquence* is criticized;

AND

The Biſhop of GLOUCESTER's *Idea of the nature and character of an inſpired language*, as delivered in his Lordſhip's *Doctrine of Grace*,

IS VINDICATED

From ALL the objections of the learned Author of the DISSERTATION.

By Dr Hurd - afterw^ds Bp of Litchfield.

LONDON,
Printed for J. WILKIE, in *St. Paul's Church-Yard*.
MDCCLXIV.

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Fellow of TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN;

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BRITISH MUSEUM

A LETTER TO The Rev. Dr. LELAND.

Rev. SIR,

I HAVE read your DISSERTATION *on the principles of human Eloquence*, and ſhall very readily, I dare ſay, be indulged in the liberty, I am going to take, of giving you my free thoughts upon it. I ſhall do it, with all the regard that is due from one ſcholar to another; and even with all the civility which may be required of ONE, who hath his reaſons for addreſſing you, in this public manner, without a name.

You entitle your work *A Diſſertation on the principles of Eloquence*: but the real ſubject of

it, is an *Opinion*, or *Paradox*, as you chuſe to term it, delivered by the Biſhop of *Glouceſter* in his late diſcourſe *on Grace*. This opinion, indeed, concerns, or rather, in your ideas, ſubverts, *the very principles* of Eloquence, which your office, it ſeems, in a learned ſociety obliged you to maintain: ſo that you cannot be blamed for giving ſome attention to the ingenious prelate's paradox, which ſo incommodiouſly came in your way. Only the more intelligent of your hearers might poſſibly think it ſtrange that, in a ſet of rhetorical Lectures, addreſſed to them, the *Controverſial* part ſhould ſo much take the lead of the *Didactic*; or rather, that the *Didactic* part ſhould ſtand quite ſtill, while the *Controverſial* keeps pacing it, with much alacrity, from one end of your Diſſertation to the other.

Yet neither, on ſecond thoughts, can you be blamed for this conduct, which one way or other might ſerve to the inſtruction of your young auditory; if not in *the principles of Rhetoric*, yet in a better thing, *the principles of Logic*. It might, further, ſerve to another purpoſe, not unworthy the regard of a Rhetoric-Lecturer. The ſubject of eloquence has been ſo exhauſted in the fine writings of antiquity, and, what is

 worſe,

worſe, has been ſo hackneyed in modern Compilations from them, that your diſcourſe wanted to be enlivened by the poignant controverſial air, you have given to it, and to be made important, by bringing an illuſtrious character into the ſcene.

ALL this I am ready to ſay in your vindication, if your conduct may be thought to require any. Having, therefore, nothing to object to the *general deſign*, or *mode* of your diſſertation, I ſhall confine myſelf entirely to the MATTER of it, after acquainting the reader, in few words, with the occaſion and ſubject of this debate.

THE Bp. of *Glouceſter*, in a late theological treatiſe *on the doctrine of Grace*, which required him to ſpeak fully to the ſubject of *inſpiration*, found it neceſſary to obviate an objection to what he conceived to be the right notion of *inſpired ſcripture*, which had been ſupported by ſome ingenious men, and very lately by Dr. MIDDLETON. The objection is delivered by the learned Doctor, in theſe words.

"IF we allow the gift [of inſpired languages] "to be laſting, we muſt conclude that ſome at

"leaſt of the books of ſcripture were in this "inſpired Greek. But we ſhould naturally ex- "pect to find an inſpired language to be ſuch "as is worthy of God; that is, pure, clear, "noble and affecting, even beyond the force of "common ſpeech; ſince nothing can come from "God but what is perfect in its kind. In ſhort, "the purity of PLATO, and the eloquence of "CICERO. Now, if we try the apoſtolic lan- "guage by this rule, we ſhall be ſo far from "aſcribing it to God, that we ſhall ſcarcely think "it worthy of man, that is, of the liberal and "polite; it being utterly rude and barbarous, "and abounding with every fault that can poſſi- "bly deform a language. And though ſome "writers, prompted by a falſe zeal, have at- "tempted to defend the purity of the Scripture- "Greek, their labour has been idly employ- "ed [a]." Thus far, the learned DOCTOR.

'THESE triumphant obſervations, ſays the 'Biſhop, are founded on two propoſitions, both 'of which he takes for granted, and yet neither 'of them is true;

[a] *Eſſay on the Gift of Tongues*, Works, vol. ii. p. 91.

'THE

'THE one, That an inſpired language muſt 'needs be a language of perfect eloquence;

'THE other, That eloquence is ſomething 'congenial and eſſential to human ſpeech [*b*].'

THE BISHOP then undertakes to ſhew the falſhood of theſe two propoſitions. You, Sir, contend for the truth of them. That the reader may be enabled to judge for himſelf between you, I ſhall quote his Lordſhip's own words, paragraph by paragragh, ſo far as any thing ſaid by him is controverted by you; and ſhall then endeavour, with all care, to pick up the looſe ends of your argument, as I find them any where *come up* in the ſeveral chapters of your Diſſertation; intermixing, as I go along, ſuch reflexions of my own, as the occaſion may ſuggeſt.

'WITH regard to the FIRST propoſition (re-'ſumes the Biſhop) I will be bold to affirm, 'that were the STYLE of the New Teſtament ex-'actly ſuch as his [Dr. MIDDLETON's] very ex-'aggerated account of it would perſuade us to

[*b*] DOCTRINE OF GRACE, b. i. c. viii. p. 41. 2d Ed. 8°.

'believe, namely, that it is *utterly rude and barbarous, and abounding with every fault that can poſſibly deform a language*, this is ſo far from 'proving ſuch language not divinely inſpired, 'that it is one certain mark of this original [*c*].'

By the manner, in which the learned Biſhop introduces this *affirmation*, one ſees that he foreſaw very clearly it would be eſteemed a *bold* one. Nay, in another place [*d*], he even takes to himſelf the ſhame, with which ſome readers, he well knew, would be forward enough to cover him, and in one word confeſſes his general notion of eloquence to be a PARADOX: *which yet*, ſays he, *like ſo many others, I have had the odd fortune to advance, will be ſeen to be only another name, for* TRUTH. After this conceſſion, it had been more generous in you to have omitted ſome invidious paſſages; ſuch as that where you ſay, *the Biſhop in his reply to this objection* [of Dr. MIDDLETON] *ſeems to have diſplayed that* BOLD OPPOSITION TO THE GENERAL OPINIONS OF MANKIND, *by which his learned labours are diſtinguiſhed*; Intr. p. ii. And again in p. vii. where you ſpeak of his principles as *paradoxical*, and

[*c*] Ib. [*d*] D. G. p 51.

implying

implying AN HARDY OPPOSITION TO THE GENERAL SENSE OF MANKIND.

BUT let the *boldneſs* of the Biſhop's principles be what it will, there is ſmall hurt done, provided they turn out, what he ſeems perſuaded they will, only *truths*. Let us attend his Lordſhip, then, in the proof of his FIRST Paradox.

'I WILL not pretend, ſays he, to point out 'which books of the N. T. were, or were not, 'compoſed by thoſe who had the Greek tongue 'thus miraculouſly infuſed into them; but this 'I will venture to ſay, that the ſtyle of a writer 'ſo inſpired, who had not (as theſe writers had 'not) afterwards cultivated his knowledge of 'the language on the principles of Grecian elo-'quence, would be preciſely ſuch as we find it 'in the books of the New Teſtament.

'FOR, if this only be allowed, which no one, 'I think, will conteſt with me, that a ſtrange 'language acquired by illiterate men, in the or-'dinary way, would be full of the idioms of 'their native tongue, juſt as the Scripture-Greek 'is obſerved to be full of Syriaſms, and He-'braiſms; how can it be pretended, by thoſe

'who

'who reflect upon the nature of language, that 'a ſtrange tongue divinely infuſed into illiterate 'men, like that at the day of Pentecoſt, could 'have any other properties and conditions [e].'

Here, the features of this bold paradox begin to ſoften a little. We are ſomething reconciled to it, 1. by being told, what the *rudeneſs and barbarity* is, which is affirmed to be *one certain mark* of an inſpired language, namely *its being full of the idioms of the native tongue* of the inſpired writer: And 2. by being told, that theſe idioms are equally to be expected whether the new language be infuſed by divine inſpiration, or acquired by illiterate men in the ordinary way. In the *latter* caſe, it is preſumed, and ſurely with reaſon enough (becauſe experience uniformly atteſts the fact), that a ſtrange language, ſo learnt, would abound in the native idioms of the learner: All that remains is to ſhew, that the event would be the ſame, in the *former*. The Biſhop then applies himſelf, in order, to this taſk.

'Let us weigh theſe caſes impartially. Every 'language conſiſts of two diſtinct parts; the 'ſingle terms, and the phraſes and idioms. The

[e] P. 41, 42.

'firſt,

'first, as far as concerns appellatives eſpecially, 'is of mere arbitrary impoſition, though on arti-'ficial principles common to all men: The 'ſecond ariſes inſenſibly, but conſtantly, from 'the manners, cuſtoms, and tempers of thoſe to 'whom the language is vernacular; and ſo be-'comes, though much leſs arbitrary (as what 'the Grammarians call *congruity* is more con-'cerned in this part than in the other), yet vari-'ous and different as the ſeveral tribes and na-'tions of mankind. The firſt therefore is un-'related to every thing but to the genius of 'language in general; the ſecond hath an inti-'mate connexion with the faſhions, notions, 'and opinions of that people only, to whom the 'language is native.

'Let us conſider then the conſtant way which 'illiterate men take to acquire the knowledge of 'a foreign tongue. Do they not make it their 'principal, and, at firſt, their only ſtudy, to trea-'ſure up in their memory the ſignification of 'the terms? Hence, when they come to talk 'or write in the ſpeech thus acquired, their 'language is found to be full of their own na-'tive idioms. And thus it will continue, till 'by long uſe of the ſtrange tongue, and eſpeci-

'ally

'ally by long acquaintance with the owners of 'it, they have imbibed the particular genius of 'the language.

'SUPPOSE then this foreign tongue, inſtead of 'being thus gradually introduced into the minds 'of theſe illiterate men, was inſtantaneouſly in-'fuſed into them; the operation (though not 'the very mode of operating) being the ſame, 'muſt not the effect be the ſame, let the cauſe 'be never ſo different? Without queſtion. The 'divine impreſſion muſt be made either by fix-'ing the terms or ſingle words only and their 'ſignification in the memory; as for inſtance, 'Greek terms correſponding to the Syriac or 'Hebrew; or elſe, together with that ſimple 'impreſſion, another muſt be made, to inrich 'the mind with all the ideas which go towards 'the compoſing the phraſes and idioms of the 'language ſo inſpired: But this latter impreſſion 'ſeems to require, or rather indeed implies, a 'previous one, of the tempers, faſhions, and 'opinions of the people to whom the language 'is native, upon the minds of them to whom 'the language is thus imparted; becauſe the 'phraſe and idiom ariſes from, and is dependent 'on, thoſe manners: and therefore the force of

'expreſſion

'expreſſion can be underſtood only in proportion 'to the knowledge of the manners: and under-'ſtood they were to be; the Recipients of this 'ſpiritual gift being not organical canals, but 'rational Diſpenſers. So that this would be a 'waſte of miracles without a ſufficient cauſe; 'the Syriac or Hebrew idiom, to which the Diſ-'ciples were enabled of themſelves to adapt the 'words of the Greek, or any other language, 'abundantly ſerving every uſeful purpoſe, all 'which centered in giving CLEAR INTELLI-'GENCE. We conclude, therefore, that what 'was thus inſpired was the TERMS, together 'with that grammatic congruity, which is de-'pendant thereon. In a word, to ſuppoſe ſuch 'kind of inſpired knowledge of *ſtrange tongues* as 'includes all the native peculiarities, which, if 'you will, you may call their *elegancies*; (for the 'more a language is coloured by the character 'and manners of the native uſers, the more 'elegant it is eſteemed) to ſuppoſe this, is, as I 'have ſaid, an ignorant fancy, and repugnant to 'reaſon and experience.

'Now, from what has been obſerved, it fol-'lows, that if the ſtyle of the N. T. were indeed 'derived from a language divinely infuſed as on

'the

'the day of Pentecoſt, it muſt be juſt ſuch, with 'regard to its ſtyle, as, in fact, we find it to be; 'that is to ſay, Greek words very frequently 'delivered in Syriac and Hebrew idiom.

'THE concluſion from the whole is this, that 'a *nominal* or *local* barbarity of ſtyle (for that this 'attribute, when applied to ſtyle, is no more 'than nominal or local, will be clearly ſhewn 'under our next head) is ſo far from being an 'objection to its miraculous acquiſition, that it 'is one mark of ſuch extraordinary original [*f*].'

I HAVE given this long quotation together, that the reader may comprehend at one view the drift and coherence of the Biſhop's argument; which is ſo clearly explained that what force it hath, can receive no addition from any comment of mine upon it.

IT is true, this force appears to you no mighty matter—"We are told, you ſay, that, in order "to convey clear intelligence to a foreigner, "nothing more is neceſſary, than to uſe the "*words* of his language adapted to the *idiom* of

[*f*] From p. 42 to p. 45.

"our

"our own. But ſhall we always find corre-
"ſpondent words in his language [g]?"

SHALL *we always find correſpondent words?*—Not always, *perfectly* correſpondent. Where does the Biſhop ſay, we ſhall? Or, how was it to his purpoſe to ſay it? He does indeed ſpeak of *ſuch a correſpondency of terms*, and chiefly *of ſuch an adaption of the terms of one language to the idiom of another*, as ſhall abundantly ſerve to give *clear intelligence*. And this is all he had occaſion to ſay.

WELL, but an exact correſpondency of terms is material. To what? To give *clear intelligence*? But if this be true, no clear intelligence can poſſibly be given in any tranſlation from one language into another; for, in all tranſlations whatever, it is neceſſary to render ſome words by others, that are not perfectly correſpondent. You will ſcarcely deny that our Engliſh tranſlation of the Goſpels conveys, in general, *clear intelligence* to the Engliſh reader, though many terms are uſed in it, and were of neceſſity to be uſed, that do not perfectly and adequately correſpond to the Greek terms, employed by the

[g] Diſſertation, p. 82.

ſacred

ſacred writers. Without doubt it was your purpoſe to convey *clear intelligence* to your Engliſh reader in the elegant tranſlations, they ſay, you have made of DEMOSTHENES: and yet doubtleſs you will acknowledge that many words of the Athenian orator are not perfectly correſpondent to thoſe employed by you in your verſion of them.

WHAT follows from this? Why, either that all tranſlations muſt be exploded and ſet aſide as inſufficient to give clear intelligence, or that we muſt accept them, with all their unavoidable imperfections, as, in general, ſufficiently repreſentative of the ſenſe of their originals, though in ſome particulars that ſenſe be inadequately conveyed to us.

BUT how then, you will ſay, ſhall we gain a clear and perfect intelligence of ſuch particulars? Why in the way, which common ſenſe ſuggeſts; by inquiring, if we are able, what the preciſe meaning is of thoſe terms of the original language, to which the tranſlated terms are thus imperfectly correſpondent. And if this be an inconvenience, 'tis an inconvenience neceſſarily attending every tranſlation in the world, in which a writer

a writer would expreſs the mixed modes denoted by the words of any other. For ſuppoſing the Greek tongue, infuſed by divine inſpiration into the ſacred writers, to have been that of PLATO or DEMOSTHENES himſelf, you will hardly pretend that it could have furniſhed them with Greek terms perfectly expreſſive of ſuch compound ideas as certain Syriac or Hebrew terms expreſſed, and of which their ſubject obliged them to give, as far as the nature of the caſe would permit, *clear intelligence*. So that I cannot for my life comprehend the drift of that ſhort queſtion, *Shall we always find correſpondent terms in a foreign language?* or, the pertinence of your learned comment on the text of CICERO's letter to SERVIUS.

I AM ſenſible indeed, that if the *terms* only of the new language were divinely infuſed, *theſe*, whether perfectly correſpondent or not, would be inſufficient of themſelves to give clear intelligence. But the Biſhop ſuppoſes more than this to be infuſed; for *what was inſpired*, he tells us, *was the Terms*, TOGETHER *with that Grammatic congruity, which is dependent thereon*. Now this knowledge of the *grammatic congruity* of any tongue, ſuperadded to a knowledge of its *terms*,

would methinks enable a writer to expreſs himſelf in it, for the moſt part, *intelligibly*.

I CONFESS, the Biſhop ſpeaks—*of fixing the terms or ſingle words* ONLY *and their ſignification in the memory*—But then he does not mean to exclude the *grammatic congruity* in the uſe of them, which, as we have ſeen, he expreſly requires in the very ſame paragraph, but merely to expoſe the notion of the *phraſes and idioms* being required, too. His Lordſhip ſpeaks of the *terms, or ſingle words* ONLY, in oppoſition to *phraſes and idioms*: you ſeem to ſpeak *of terms or ſingle words* ONLY, in oppoſition to *ſyſtematic congruity*.

I SAY, you *ſeem* ſo to ſpeak: for otherwiſe I know not what to make of all you ſay concerning the inſufficiency of the *terms only* of any language to give intelligence. And yet, in what follows, you *ſeem* to do juſtice to the Biſhop, and to admit that, beſides the *terms*, a *grammatic congruity in the uſe of them* was divinely inſpired. For you go on to obſerve, "That the real "purport of almoſt every ſentence in every "language, is not to be learned from the ſigni-"fication of detached words, *and their gram-*

" *matical congruity*, even where their ſignification " may be expreſſed by correſpondent words in " another language [*b*]."

AND here, Sir, your learning expatiates through ſeveral pages: the purpoſe of all which is to ſhew, that, if the *terms* of one language, though *congruouſly uſed*, be ſtrictly adapted to the *idiom* of another, ſtill they would give no intelligence, or at leaſt a very obſcure one; as you endeavour to prove by a *decent* inſtance, taken from your countryman, SWIFT, in his dotages; and another, given by yourſelf in a literal verſion of a long paſſage of a ſacred writer. It is true, in this laſt inſtance, you do not confine yourſelf to the ſtrict obſervance of *grammatic congruity*. If you had done this, it would have appeared, from your own inſtance, that *intelligence* might have been given, and with tolerable *clearneſs* too, even in a literal verſion.

BUT be it allowed, that, if the terms of one language, even though a congruous conſtruction be obſerved, be conſtantly and ſtrictly adapted to the *idioms* of another, the expreſſion will ſtill, many times, be very dark and obſcure: how is this *obſcurity* to be prevented? Take what lan-

[*b*] Diſſert. p. 82.

guage you will for the conveyance of inſtruction, it will be neceſſary for the reader or hearer to gain a competent knowledge of its idioms and phraſeology, before he can receive the full benefit of it. So that, unleſs there had been a language in the world, native to all nations, and in the ſtricteſt ſenſe of the word, *univerſal*, I ſee not how inſpiration itſelf could remedy this inconvenience. Suppoſe, as I ſaid before, that the inſpired language, in which the Apoſtles wrote, had been the pureſt Greek, ſtill its *idiomatic phraſeology* had been as ſtrange and obſcure to all ſuch to whom that language was not native, as the Syriac or Hebrew idioms, by which the Apoſtolic Greek is now ſuppoſed to be ſo much darkened.

I CONCLUDE upon the whole, that nothing you have ſaid, overturns, or ſo much as affects, the learned Prelate's notion of divine inſpiration, *as conveying only the terms and ſingle words of one language, correſponding to thoſe of another, together with that grammatic congruity in the uſe of them, which is dependant thereon.* This *firſt and grand principle*, as you call it, of the Bp's new theory, *is ſuch*, you ſay, *as no critic or grammarian can admit*

admit [*i*]. On the contrary, I muſt preſume to think, becauſe I have now ſhewn, that no critic or grammarian, who deſerves the name, can reaſonably object to this *principle*, as it allows all that is neceſſary to be ſuppoſed of an inſpired language, its ſufficiency to give clear intelligence: ſo *clear*, that, had the idioms of the new language been inſpired too, it could not, in the general view of providence, who intended this intelligence for the uſe of all people and languages, have been clearer.

But your unfavorable ſentiment of the Biſhop's principle ariſes from your miſconception of the *circumſtances*, *abilities*, and *qualifications* of the Apoſtles, when they addreſſed themſelves to the work of their miniſtry, and eſpecially to the work of compoſing books for the inſtruction of the faithful in this originally inſpired language.

When the Greek language was firſt infuſed, it would, no doubt, be full of their native phraſes, or rather it would be wholly and entirely adapted to the Hebrew or Syriac idioms. This would render their expreſſion ſomewhat dark and obſcure to their Grecian hearers. But then it

[*i*] Diſſert. p. 86.

would be intelligible enough to thoſe, to whom they firſt and principally addreſſed themſelves, the *Helleniſtic Jews*, who, though they underſtood Greek beſt, were generally no ſtrangers to the Hebrew idiom.

FURTHER ſtill, though this Hebrew-Greek language was all that was originally infuſed into the Apoſtles, nothing hinders but that they might, in the ordinary way, improve themſelves in the Greek tongue, and ſuperadd to their inſpired knowledge whatever they could acquire, beſides, by their converſation with the native Greeks, and the ſtudy of their language. For, though it can hardly be imagined, as the Biſhop ſays, *that the inſpired writers had cultivated their knowledge of the language on the principles of the Grecian eloquence* [k], that is, had formed and perfected their ſtyle by an anxious and critical attention to the rules and practice of the Greek rhetors, yet we need not conclude that they wholly neglected to improve themſelves in the knowledge and uſe of this new language. So that by the time they turned themſelves to the Gentiles, and ſtill more by the time they applied themſelves to pen the books of the N. T. they

[k] *Doctrine of Grace*, p. 41.

might

might be tolerable maſters even of the peculiar phraſeology of the Greek tongue, and might be able to adapt it, in a good meaſure, to the Greek idioms.

ALL this, I ſay, is very *ſuppoſeable*; becauſe their turning to the Gentiles was not till near TEN years, after the deſcent of the Holy Ghoſt upon the Apoſtles; and the date of their earlieſt writings, penned for the edification of the Church, was not till near TWENTY years after that period: In all which time, they had full leiſure and opportunity to acquire a competent knowledge of the native idiomatic Greek, abundantly ſufficient to anſwer all ends of clearneſs and inſtruction.

BUT I go further and ſay, It is not only very *ſuppoſeable*, and perfectly conſiſtent with all the Biſhop has advanced on the ſubject of inſpiration, that the ſacred writers *might* thus improve themſelves, but it is, likewiſe, very *clear* and *certain*, that they DID. How elſe are we to account for that difference of ſtyle, obſervable in the ſacred writers, whoſe expreſſion is more or leſs coloured by their native Hebrew idioms, according as their acquaintance with the Greek tongue was more or leſs perfect? There were

ſtill, no doubt, very many of their own native idioms, interſperſed in their moſt improved Greek: As muſt ever be the caſe of writers who compoſe in a foreign tongue, whether acquired in the ordinary way, or ſupernaturally infuſed into them: But theſe barbariſms, as they are called, I mean theſe Syriaſms or Hebraiſms, are not ſo conſtant and perpetual as to prevent their writings from giving *clear intelligence*. In ſhort, the ſtyle of the inſpired writers is JUST that which we ſhould naturally expect it to be, on this ſuppoſition of its being ſomewhat improved by uſe and exerciſe, and which the learned Biſhop *accurately* (and in perfect *conſiſtency* with his main principle, *of the terms only being inſpired, with the congruous uſe of them*) defines it to be, "*Greek words* VERY FREQUENTLY *delivered in Syriac and Hebrew idiom* [*l*]."

THUS, in every view, the Biſhop's *grand* principle may be ſafely admitted. All that we *need* ſuppoſe, and therefore all that is *reaſonable* to be ſuppoſed, is, *That the terms of the Greek language, and a grammatical congruity in the uſe of them*, was miraculouſly infuſed: The reſt would be competently

[*l*] *Doctrine of Grace*, p. 45.

petently and ſufficiently obtained by the application of ordinary means, without a miracle.

AFTER SAYING ſo little, or rather after ſaying indeed *nothing*, that affects the Biſhop's principle, I cannot but think it is with an ill grace you turn yourſelf to cavil at the *following incidental obſervation* of his Lordſhip, which yet will be found as true and as juſt as any other he has made on this ſubject.

To thoſe, who might expect, *that, beſides the ſimple impreſſion of the Greek terms only, and their ſignification* on the minds of the inſpired linguiſts, *another ſhould have been made to inrich the mind with all the ideas which go towards the compoſing the phraſes and idioms of the language ſo inſpired* (all which had been neceſſary, if the inſpired language had been intended for a perfect model of Grecian eloquence) the Biſhop replies—'This 'latter impreſſion ſeems to require, or rather in-'deed implies, a previous one, of the tempers, 'faſhions, and opinions of the people to whom 'the language is native, upon the minds of them 'to whom the language is thus imparted; be-'cauſe the phraſe and idiom ariſes from and is 'dependent on thoſe manners [*m*].' But ſuch

[*m*] *Doctrine of Grace*, p. 43.

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an impreſſion, as this, he goes on to ſhew, was not to be expected.

IT is clear from this paſſage, that the Biſhop is ſpeaking of *an impreſſion*, neceſſary to be made on the minds of the Apoſtles, if the inſpired language had been ſo complete as to extend to all its native phraſes and idioms. If the Apoſtles were inſtantly to poſſeſs the inſpired Greek in this perfection, it is neceſſary to ſuppoſe that this *laſt* impreſſion muſt, as well as that of the terms, be made upon them. Can any thing be more certain and undeniable, than this *affirmation?* Yet, in p. 86. of your book, you have this ſtrange paſſage.

AFTER having ſhewn, as you ſuppoſe, that the Biſhop's grand principle, of the inſpiration of the TERMS only, ſtands on a very inſecure foundation, "Perhaps, you ſay, it is no leſs HAZARD-"ous to affirm, that a knowledge of the idiom "or phraſeology of any language, *always* implies "a previous knowledge of the cuſtoms and "manners of thoſe to whom it is vernacular."

You intended, no doubt, in your cenſure of this hazardous poſition, to oppoſe ſomething which

which the Biſhop had affirmed. Be pleaſed now to caſt your eye on the paſſage you criticize, and tell me where the Biſhop aſſerts, *that a* KNOWLEDGE *of the idiom or phraſeology of any language* ALWAYS *implies a previous knowledge of the cuſtoms and manners of thoſe to whom it is vernacular.* What the Biſhop aſſerts is, *That an* IMPRESSION *of the phraſes and idioms of an inſpired language implies a previous* IMPRESSION *of the tempers, faſhions, and opinions of the people to whom the language is native, upon the minds of them to whom the language is* THUS *imparted:* that is, if a knowledge of the idioms had been *impreſſed*, a knowledge of the cuſtoms and manners, from which thoſe idioms ariſe, and without a knowledge of which they could not be underſtood (as they were to be, by the recipients of this ſpiritual gift) muſt have been *impreſſed*, likewiſe. No, you ſay: a *knowledge* of the idiom of a language does not *always* imply a previous *knowledge* of the manners. Who ſays, it does? We may come to *know* the idioms of languages, without a *divine impreſſion:* and without ſuch impreſſion, for any thing appears to the contrary, the Biſhop might ſuppoſe the ſacred writers came by their knowledge, ſo far as they poſſeſſed it, of the Greek idioms. But the *impreſſion* of ſuch idioms could only come

come from another and *previous impreſſion* of the cuſtoms and manners: becauſe in this caſe, without a previous impreſſion of the *cuſtoms and manners*, the *idioms* themſelves, when impreſſed, could not have been underſtood, nor conſequently put to uſe, by the perſons, on whom this impreſſion was made. They had no time to recur to Lexicons, Grammars, and Commentaries to know the meaning of the impreſſed idioms. How then were they, on the inſtant, to know their meaning at all, but by a *previous impreſſion* of the manners, from which they aroſe, and which would put them into a capacity of underſtanding theſe impreſſed idioms?

In a word, the Biſhop is ſpeaking of SUPERNATURAL IMPRESSION: you, of NATURAL KNOWLEDGE. No wonder, then, your reaſoning and your learning, in the concluding pages of this chapter, ſhould look entirely *beſide* the matter in hand, or, at beſt, ſhould look ſo *aſkew* on the Biſhop's *hazardous* poſition. It is certain, you are far enough out of all danger of encountering it, when you entrench yourſelf, at length, behind this diſtant and ſecure concluſion —"that the knowledge of idiom is ſo far from "requiring, or implying a previous one of "tempers,

" tempers, manners, *&c.* that the very CONVERSE " of this ſeems to be the ſafer principle; and " that tempers and manners are not to be " learned, without ſome degree of previous " acquaintance with the peculiarities of a lan- " guage [*n*]:" a propoſition, which though exceptionable enough, as you put it, and even ſuggeſting ſome pleaſant ideas, I am in no humour, at preſent, to conteſt with you.

THIS, SIR, IS THE WHOLE of what I find advanced by you, that hath any ſhew or appearance of being intended as a Confutation of the argument by which the Biſhop ſupports his FIRST PARADOX; in oppoſition to Dr. MIDDLETON's opinion, *That an inſpired language muſt needs be a language of perfect eloquence.* The Biſhop has told us in very accurate terms what he conceives the character of an inſpired language muſt needs be: and I have at leaſt ſhewn, that the character he gives of it may be a juſt one, notwithſtanding any thing you have objected to it in your learned Diſſertation.

I NOW proceed to the Biſhop's SECOND PARADOX; which oppoſes Dr. MIDDLETON's *ſecond*

[*n*] Diſſert. p. 88.

Propoſition,

Propoſition, That eloquence is ſomething congenial and eſſential to human ſpeech, and inherent in the conſtitution of things.

'THIS ſuppoſes, ſays the Biſhop, that there is 'ſome certain ARCHETYPE in nature, to which 'that quality refers, and on which it is to be 'formed and modelled. And, indeed, admitting 'this to be the caſe, one ſhould be apt enough 'to conclude, that when the Author of nature 'condeſcended to inſpire one of theſe plaſtic 'performances of human art, he would make it 'by the exacteſt pattern of the *Archetype*.

'BUT the propoſition is fanciful and falſe. 'Eloquence is not congenial or eſſential to 'human ſpeech, nor is there any Archetype in 'nature to which that quality refers. It is acci-'dental and arbitrary, and depends on cuſtom 'and faſhion: it is a mode of human commu-'nication which changes with the changing 'climates of the Earth; and is as various and 'unſtable as the genius, temper, and manners 'of its diverſified inhabitants. For what is 'PURITY but the uſe of ſuch terms, with their 'multiplied combinations, as the intereſt, the 'complexion, or the caprice of a writer or

'ſpeaker

'ſpeaker of authority hath preferred to its 'equals? What is ELEGANCE but ſuch a turn of 'idiom as a faſhionable fancy hath brought into 'repute? And what is SUBLIMITY but the ap-'plication of ſuch images, as arbitrary or caſual 'connexions, rather than their own native gran-'deur, have dignified and ennobled? Now ELO-'QUENCE is a compound of theſe three qualities 'of ſpeech, and conſequently muſt be as nominal 'and unſubſtantial as its conſtituent parts. So 'that, that mode of compoſition, which is a 'model of *perfect eloquence* to one nation or peo-'ple, muſt appear extravagant or mean to an-'other. And thus in fact it was. Indian and 'Aſiatic eloquence were eſteemed hyperbolic, 'unnatural, abrupt and puerile to the more 'phlegmatic inhabitants of *Rome* and *Athens*. 'And the weſtern eloquence, in its turn, appeared 'nerveleſs and effeminate, frigid or inſipid, to the 'hardy and inflamed imaginations of the Eaſt. 'Nay, what is more, each ſpecies, even of the 'moſt approved genus, changed its nature with 'the change of clime and language; and the 'ſame expreſſion, which, in one place, had the 'utmoſt *ſimplicity*, had, in another, the utmoſt '*ſublime* [o].'

[o] *Doctrine of Grace*, p. 52, 53.

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THE Biſhop then proceeds to illuſtrate this laſt obſervation by a famous inſtance, taken from the firſt chapter of *Geneſis*, and then recapitulates and enforces his general argument in the following manner.

'APPLY all this to the books of the N. T. 'an authorized collection, profeſſedly deſigned 'for the rule and direction of mankind. Now 'ſuch a rule demanded that it ſhould be inſpired 'of God. But inſpired writing, the objectors 'ſay, implies the moſt *perfect eloquence*. What 'human model then was the Holy Ghoſt to fol-'low? And a human model, of arbitrary con-'ſtruction, it muſt needs be, becauſe there was 'no other: Or, if there were another, it would 'never ſuit the purpoſe, which was to make an 'impreſſion on the minds and affections; and 'this impreſſion, ſuch an eloquence only as that 'which had gained the popular ear, could effect. 'Should therefore the *eaſtern* eloquence be em-'ployed? But this would be too inflated and 'gigantic for the *Weſt*. Should it be the *weſtern?* 'But this would be too cold and torpid for the '*Eaſt*. Or, ſuppoſe the *generic* eloquence of the 'more poliſhed nations was to be preferred,

'which

'which *ſpecies* of it was to be employed? The 'rich exuberance of the Aſiatic Greeks, or the 'dry conciſeneſs of the Spartans? The pure and 'poignant eaſe and flowing ſweetneſs of the At-'tic modulation, or the ſtrength and grave ſeve-'rity of the Roman tone? Or ſhould all give way 'to that African torrent, which aroſe from the 'fermented mixture of the dregs of *Greece* and '*Italy*, and ſoon after overflowed the church 'with theological conceits in a ſparkling luxuri-'ancy of thought, and a ſombrous rankneſs of 'expreſſion? Thus various were the ſpecies's! 'all as much decried by a different genus, and 'each as much diſliked by a different ſpecies, as 'the eloquence of the remoteſt Eaſt and Weſt, 'by one another [*p*].'

Thus far the learned Biſhop, *with the ſpirit and energy*, as you well obſerve, *of an antient orator* [*q*]; and, let me add, with a juſtneſs and force of reaſoning, which would have done honour to the beſt antient Philoſopher. But here we ſeparate again. You maintain, with Dr. Middleton, *that eloquence is ſomething congenial and eſſential to human ſpeech*: While *I*, convinced by the Biſhop's reaſoning in theſe paragraphs, maintain that it aſſuredly is not.

[*p*] *Doctrine of Grace*, p. 55, 56. [*q*] Differt. p. 19.

THE ſubject, indeed, affords great ſcope to your rhetorical faculties; and the cauſe, you maintain, being that, as you conceive, of the antient orators, and even of eloquence itſelf, you ſuffer your enthuſiaſm to bear you away, without controul; and, as is the natural effect of enthuſiaſm, with ſo little method and preciſion of argument, that a cool examiner of your work hardly knows how to follow you, or where to take aim at you, in your aery and uncertain flight. However, I ſhall do my beſt to reduce your Rhetoric to Reaſon; I mean, to repreſent the ſubſtance of what you ſeem to intend by way of argument againſt the Biſhop's principle, leaving your eloquence to make what impreſſion on the gentle reader it may.

AND, FIRST, in oppoſition, as you ſuppoſe, to the Biſhop's tenet, "*That eloquence is* NOT *ſomething congenial and eſſential to human ſpeech*," you apply yourſelf to ſhew, through ſeveral chapters, that tropes, metaphors, allegories, and univerſally what are called by Rhetoricians *figures of ſpeech*, are natural and neceſſary expreſſions of the paſſions, and have their birth in the very reaſon and conſtitution of things. To make out this important point is the ſole drift of your I, II, III, and IVth Chapters; in which you ſeem to me

to

to be contending for that which nobody denies, and to be diſputing without an opponent. At leaſt, you can hardly believe that the Biſhop of *Glouceſter* is to be told, that metaphors, allegories, and ſimilitudes are the offſpring of nature and neceſſity, HE, who has, *with the utmoſt juſtneſs and elegance of reaſoning*, as you well obſerve [*r*], explained this very point, himſelf, in the DIVINE LEGATION.

WHAT then are we to conclude from theſe elaborate chapters? Why, that by ſome unlucky miſtake or other, let us call it only by the ſofter name, of *inattention*, you have entirely miſrepreſented the ſcope and purpoſe of all the Biſhop has ſaid on the ſubject of eloquence. And that this is no haſty or groundleſs charge, but the very truth of the caſe, will clearly be ſeen from a brief examination of the Biſhop's theory, compared with your reaſonings upon it.

THE poſition, *that eloquence is ſomething congenial and eſſential to human ſpeech, ſuppoſes*, ſays the Biſhop, *that there is ſome certain Archetype in nature, to which that quality refers, and on which it is to be formed and modelled.*

[*r*] Differt. p. 4.

THE Biſhop, you ſee, requires an *Archetype* to be pointed out to him of that conſummate eloquence, which is ſaid to be *congenial and eſſential to human ſpeech*. The demand is ſurely reaſonable; and not difficult to be complied with, if ſuch an Archetype do, in fact, ſubſiſt. But do you know of any ſuch? Do you refer him to any ſuch? Do you ſpecify that *compoſition?* or do you ſo much as delineate that *ſort* of compoſition, which will paſs upon all men under the idea of an Archetype? Nothing of all this. Permit us then to attend to the Biſhop's reaſoning, by which he undertakes to prove that no ſuch Archetype does or can exiſt.

'The propoſition [that aſſerts, there is ſuch an 'Archetype] is fanciful and falſe. Eloquence 'is not congenial or eſſential to human ſpeech, 'nor is there any Archetype in nature to which 'that quality refers. It is accidental and arbi-'trary, and depends on cuſtom and faſhion: It 'is a mode of human communication which 'changes with the changing climates of the 'earth; and is as various and unſtable as the 'genius, temper, and manners of its diverſified 'inhabitants [*s*].'

[*s*] *Doctrine of Grace*, p. 52.

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THE Biſhop aſſerts *there is no Archetype*, becauſe eloquence is a variable thing, depending on cuſtom and faſhion; is nothing abſolute in itſelf, but relative to the fancies and prejudices of men, and changeable, as the different climes they inhabit. This *general* reaſon ſeems convincing: it appeals to fact, to experience, to the evidence of ſenſe. But the learned Prelate goes further. He analyzes the complex idea of eloquence: he examines the qualities of ſpeech, of which it is made up; and he ſhews that they are nominal and unſubſtantial. Hence it follows, again, That there is no Archetype in nature of perfect eloquence; its very conſtituent parts, as they are deemed, having no ſubſtance or reality in them.

BUT why ſhould the Biſhop condeſcend to this analyſis, when his *general argument* ſeemed deciſive of the queſtion? For a good reaſon. When the Biſhop aſked for an ARCHETYPE, though you are ſhy of producing any, he well knew that the maſters of Eloquence, thoſe I mean who are accounted ſuch in theſe parts of the world, had pretended to give one. He knew the authority of theſe maſters of human ſpeech with the ſort of men, he had to deal with: he therefore takes the Archetype, they have given, and ſhews,

upon their own ideas of eloquence, it is a mere phantom.

It is not to be ſuppoſed that the Biſhop, in touching incidentally the queſtion of Eloquence in a theological treatiſe, ſhould follow the Greek and Latin rhetors through all the niceties and diſtinctions of their Art, or ſhould amuſe himſelf or us with a minute detail of all the particulars which go to the making up of this mighty compound, their ARCHETYPAL IDEA of human eloquence. If he had been ſo pleaſed, and had had no better buſineſs on his hands, it is likely he could have told us *news*, as you have done, out of ARISTOTLE, LONGINUS, and CICERO. But his manner is to ſay no more on a ſubject, than the occaſion makes neceſſary; which, in the preſent caſe, was no more than to acquaint his reader, in very general terms, with the conſtituent parts of eloquence; which he reſolves into theſe three, PURITY, ELEGANCE, and SUBLIMITY.

But this you call *a moſt illogical diviſion of Eloquence; for that the Biſhop hath not only enumerated the conſtituent parts imperfectly; but, of the three qualities which he hath exhibited, the firſt is included in the ſecond, and the third is not neceſſarily and univerſally a part of eloquence* [*t*].

[*t*] Diſſert. p. 41.

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THE *enumeration*, you ſay, *is imperfect*. Yet *Purity*, I think, denotes whatever comes under the idea of PROPRIETY, that is, of approved cuſtom, as well as grammatical uſe, in any language: *Elegance*, expreſſes all thoſe embelliſhments of compoſition, which are the effect of ART: and I know no fitter term than *Sublimity*, to ſtand for thoſe qualities of eloquence, which are derived from the efforts of Genius, or NATURAL PARTS. Now what elſe can be required to complete the idea of Eloquence, and what defect of logic can there be in comprehending the various properties of human ſpeech under theſe three generic names? The diviſion is ſurely ſo natural and ſo intelligible, that few readers, I believe, will be diſpoſed to object with you, *that the firſt of the three qualities is included in the ſecond, and that the third is not neceſſarily and univerſally a part of eloquence.*

BUT let the Biſhop's enumeration be ever ſo *logical*, you further quarrel with his *idea* of theſe three conſtituent parts of eloquence, and his reaſoning upon them.

'WHAT, ſays his Lordſhip, is PURITY but 'the uſe of ſuch terms with their multiplied 'combinations, as the intereſt, the complexion,

'or the caprice of a writer or ſpeaker of autho-
'rity hath preferred to its equals?'

THIS idea of purity in language you think ſtrange; and yet in the very chapter in which you ſet yourſelf to contemplate and to reprobate this *ſtrange idea*, you cannot help reſolving *purity*, into *uſage and cuſtom*, that is, with QUINCTILIAN, into *conſenſum eruditorum*; which ſurely is but ſaying in other words with the Biſhop, that it conſiſts *in the uſe of ſuch terms, with their multiplied combinations, as the intereſt, the complexion, or the caprice of a writer or ſpeaker of Authority hath preferred to its equals*—for *equals* they undoubtedly were, till that uſage or cuſtom took place. When this *conſent of the learned* is once eſtabliſhed, every writer or ſpeaker, who pretends to *purity* of expreſſion, muſt doubtleſs conform to it: but previouſly to ſuch conſent, *purity* is a thing arbitrary enough to juſtify the Biſhop's concluſion, that this quality *is not congenial and eſſential to human ſpeech*.

NEXT, the Biſhop aſks, 'What is ELEGANCE
'but ſuch a turn of idiom as a faſhionable fancy
'hath brought into repute?'

HERE, again, you grow very nice in your inquiries into the idea of *fancy*, the idea of *faſhion*, and

and I know not what of that ſort. In a word, you go on *defining*, and *diſtinguiſhing* to the end of the chapter, in a way that without doubt would be very edifying to your young ſcholars in *Trinity College*, but, as levelled againſt the Biſhop, is certainly unſeaſonable and out of place. For define *elegance*, as you will, it finally reſolves into ſomething that *is not of the eſſence of human ſpeech*, but factitious and arbitrary; as depending much on the taſte, the fancy, the caprice (call it what you pleaſe) of ſuch writers or ſpeakers, as have obtained the popular vogue for this ſpecies of eloquence, and ſo had the fortune to bring the turn of idiom and expreſſion, which they preferred and cultivated, into general repute.

'LASTLY,' the Biſhop aſks, 'What is SUBLI-'MITY but the application of ſuch images, as 'arbitrary or caſual connexions, rather than their 'own native grandeur, have dignified and en-'nobled?'

To this queſtion you reply by aſking another, *Whether ſublimity doth neceſſarily conſiſt in the application of images?* But, *firſt*, if what is *called* Sublimity, *generally* conſiſts in the application of images, it is abundantly ſufficient to the Biſhop's purpoſe:

purpoſe: *Next*, I preſume to ſay, that the ſublime of eloquence, or the impreſſion which a genius makes upon us by his expreſſion, conſiſts neceſſarily and univerſally in the application of *images*, that is, of bright and vivid ideas, which is the true, that is, the received ſenſe of the word, *images*, (however rhetoricians may have diſtinguiſhed different kinds of them, and expreſſed them by different names) in all rhetorical and critical works. *Laſtly*, I maintain that theſe bright and vivid ideas are rendered *intereſting* to the reader or hearer from the influence of ASSOCIATION, rather than *of their own native dignity and grandeur*: of which I could give ſo many inſtances, that, for this reaſon, I will only give your *own*, which you lay ſo much ſtreſs upon, of *the famous oath by the ſouls of thoſe who fought at* Marathon *and* Platæa [*u*]: where the peculiar ideas of *intereſt*, *glory*, and *veneration*, aſſociated to the *image* or idea of the battle of *Marathon* and *Platæa*, gave a ſublime and energy to this oath of DEMOSTHENES, *by the ſouls of thoſe that fought there*, in the conceptions of his countrymen, which no other people could have felt from it, and of which you, Sir, with all your admiration of it, have certainly a very faint conception at this time.

[*u*] Diſſert. p. 45.

I SHOULD

I SHOULD here have diſpatched this article of *Sublimity*, but that you will expect me to take ſome notice of your objection to what the Biſhop obſerves, 'That this ſpecies of eloquence changed 'its nature, with the change of clime and lan-'guage; and that the ſame expreſſion, which in 'one place had the utmoſt *ſimplicity*, had, in an-'other, the utmoſt *ſublime* [*w*]:' An obſervation, which he illuſtrates and confirms by the various fortune of the famous paſſage in *Geneſis*, *God ſaid, Let there be light, and there was light*; ſo *ſublime*, in the apprehenſion of LONGINUS and BOILEAU, and ſo *ſimple*, in that of HUETIUS and LE CLERC.

To this pertinent illuſtration, moſt ingeniouſly explained and enforced by the learned Prelate, you reply with much eaſe, "That this might "well be, and even in the ſame place," and then proceed to *inform* him of I know not what union between *ſimplicity* and *ſublimity*; though you *civilly* add, "That it is a point known to "every SMATTERER in criticiſm, that theſe two "qualities are ſo far from being inconſiſtent "with each other, that they are frequently "united by a natural and inſeparable union [*x*]."

[*w*] *Doctrine of Grace*, p. 53. [*x*] Differt. p. 58.

"SIMPLICITY

"SIMPLICITY and *ſublimity* may be found toge-
"ther." I think the propoſition falſe, in your ſenſe of it, at leaſt. But be it true, that theſe qualities in expreſſion may be found together. What then? The queſtion is of a paſſage, where theſe qualities, in the apprehenſion of great critics, are found ſeparately; the one ſide maintaining that it is merely *ſimple*, the other, that it is merely *ſublime*. *Simplicity* is, here, plainly oppoſed to *ſublimity*, and implies the abſence of it: BOILEAU, after LONGINUS, affirming that the expreſſion *is*, and his adverſaries affirming that it is *not*, *ſublime*. Can any thing ſhew more clearly, that the *ſublime* of eloquent expreſſion depends on *caſual aſſociations*, and not on the nature of things?

BUT the Biſhop goes further and tells us, what the *aſſociations* were that occaſioned theſe different judgments of the paſſage in queſtion. The ideas ſuggeſted in it were *familiar*, to the ſacred writer: they were *new* and admirable, to the Pagan Critic. Hence the expreſſion would be of the greateſt *ſimplicity* in MOSES, though it would be naturally eſteemed by LONGINUS, infinitely *ſublime*.

HERE you cavil a little about the Effect of *familiarity*: but, as conſcious of the weakneſs of this

this part of your anſwer, *Not to inſiſt*, you ſay, *upon this, How comes it then that* BOILEAU *and many other Chriſtian readers, to whom the ideas of creation were as familiar as to* MOSES *himſelf, were yet affected by the ſublime of this paſſage?* You aſk, How this comes to paſs? How? Why in the way, in which ſo many other ſtrange things come to paſs, by *the influence of authority*. LONGINUS had ſaid, the expreſſion of this paſſage was *ſublime*. And when he had ſaid this, the wonder is to find two men, ſuch as HUETIUS and LE CLERC, who durſt, after that, honeſtly declare their own feelings, and profeſs that, to them, the expreſſion was *not* ſublime.

BUT more on this head of *Authority*, preſently.

You ſee, Sir, I paſs over theſe chapters *on the qualities of Eloquence*, though they make ſo large a part of your *Diſſertation*, very rapidly: and I do it, not to eſcape from any force I apprehend there to be in your argument or obſervations, but becauſe I am perſuaded that every man, who knows what language is and how it is formed, is ſo convinced that thoſe qualities of it by which it comes to be denominated *pure*, and *elegant*, and *intereſting*, are the effects of *cuſtom*, *faſhion*, and *aſſociation*,

aſſociation, that he would not thank me for employing many words on ſo plain a point. Only, as you conclude this part of your work with *an appeal*, which you think ſufficiently *warranted, againſt the moſt poſitive deciſions of faſhion, cuſtom, or prejudice, to certain general and eſtabliſhed principles of rational criticiſm*, ſubverſive, as you think, of the Biſhop's whole theory, I ſhall be bold to tell you, as I juſt now promiſed, what my opinion is *of theſe eſtabliſhed rules of* RATIONAL CRITICISM: by which you will underſtand how little I conceive the Biſhop's ſyſtem to be affected by this confident appeal to *ſuch principles*.

I HOLD then, that what you ſolemnly call *the eſtabliſhed principles of rational criticiſm* are only ſuch principles as criticiſm hath ſeen good to eſtabliſh *on the practice of the Greek and Roman ſpeakers and writers*; the European eloquence being ultimately the mere product and reſult of ſuch practice; and European criticiſm being no further *rational* than as it accords to it. This is the way, in which antient and modern critics have gone to work in forming their ſyſtems: and their ſyſtems deſerve to be called *rational*, becauſe they deliver ſuch rules as experience has found moſt conducive to attain the ends of eloquence in theſe parts of the world. Had you attended

attended to this obvious conſideration, it is impoſſible you ſhould have alarmed yourſelf ſo much, as you ſeem to have done, at the Biſhop's bold Paradox, as if it threatened the downfall of Eloquence itſelf: which, you now ſee, ſtands exactly as it did, and is juſt as ſecure in all its eſtabliſhed rights and privileges on the Biſhop's ſyſtem of *there being no Archetype of Eloquence in nature*, as upon your's, *that there is one*. The rules of criticiſm are juſt the ſame on either ſuppoſition, and will continue the ſame ſo long as we take the Greek and Roman writers for our maſters and models; nay, ſo long as the influence of their authority, now confirmed and ſtrengthened by the practice of ages, and ſtruck deep into the European notions and manners, ſhall ſubſiſt.

You need, therefore, be in no pain for the intereſts of eloquence, which are ſo dear to you; nor for the dignity of your *Rhetorical office* in the Univerſity of *Dublin*; which is ſurely of importance enough, if you teach your *young hearers* how to become eloquent in that ſcene where their employment of it is likely to fall; without pretending to engage them in certain chimerical projects how they may attain an eſſential univerſal eloquence, or ſuch as will paſs for eloquence in all ages and countries of the world.

You

You ſee, Sir, if this opinion of mine be a truth, that it overturns at once the whole ſtructure of your book. We, no doubt, who have been lectured in Greek and Roman eloquence, think it preferable to any other; and we think ſo, becauſe it conforms to certain rules which our criticiſm has eſtabliſhed, without conſidering that thoſe rules are only eſtabliſhed on the ſucceſsful practice of European writers and ſpeakers, and are therefore no rules at all in ſuch times and places where a different, perhaps a contrary practice is followed with the ſame ſucceſs. Let a Spartan, an Aſiatic, an African, a Chineſe ſyſtem of rhetoric be given: Each of theſe ſhall differ from other, yet each ſhall be beſt and moſt *rational*, as relative to the people for whom it is formed. Nay, to ſee how groundleſs all your fancies of a *rational eſſential eloquence are*, do but reflect that even the European eloquence, though founded on the ſame general principles, is yet different in different places, in many reſpects. I could tell you of a country, and that at no great diſtance, where that which is thought ſupremely *elegant*, paſſes in another country, not leſs converſant in the *eſtabliſhed principles of rational criticiſm*, for FINICAL; while what, in this country, is accepted under the idea of *ſublimity*,

is derided, in that other, as no better than BOMBAST.

WHAT follows, now, from this appeal to *experience*, againſt your appeal to the *eſtabliſhed rules of criticiſm?* Plainly this: That all the rhetors of antiquity put together are no authority againſt what the Biſhop of *Glouceſter* aſſerts concerning the nature of eloquence; ſince THEY only tell us (and we will take their word for it) what will *pleaſe or affect* under *certain* circumſtances, while the BISHOP only queſtions, whether the ſame rules, under ALL circumſtances, will enable a writer or ſpeaker to *pleaſe and affect*. Strange! that you ſhould not ſee the inconſequence of your own reaſoning. The Biſhop ſays, The rules of eloquence are for the moſt part local and arbitrary: No, you ſay, The rules are not local and arbitrary, FOR they were held reaſonable ones at *Athens* and *Rome*. Your very anſwer ſhews, that they were local and arbitrary. You ſee, then, why I make ſo ſlight, on this occaſion, of all your multiplied citations from the antient writers, which, how reſpectable ſoever, are no deciſive authority, indeed no authority at all, in the preſent caſe.

HITHERTO, the Biſhop had been conſidering eloquence ONLY SO FAR as it is founded in arbi-

trary principles and local prejudices. For though his expreſſion had been general, he knew very well that his theſis admitted ſome limitation; having directly affirmed of *the various modes of eloquence*, not that they were altogether and in all reſpects, but MOSTLY *fantaſtical*, p. 67. which, though you are pleaſed to charge it upon him as an *inconſiſtency* [*y*], the reader ſees is only a neceſſary qualification of his general theſis, ſuch as might be expected in ſo exact a writer, as the learned Biſhop. He now then attends to this limitation, and conſiders what effect it would have on his main theory.

'IT will be ſaid, *Are there not ſome more ſubſtantial principles of eloquence, common to all* the various ſpecies that have obtained in the world? — Without doubt, there are. — Why then ſhould not theſe have been employed, to do credit to the Apoſtolic inſpiration? For good reaſons: reſpecting both the Speaker and the Hearers. For what *is* eloquence but a perſuaſive turn given to the elocution to ſupply that inward, that conſcious perſuaſion of the ſpeaker, ſo neceſſary to gain a fair hearing? But the firſt preachers of the Goſpel did not need a ſuccedaneum to that inward conſcious

[*y*] Diſſert. p. 80. n.

perſuaſion.

'perſuaſion. And what is the *end* of eloquence, 'even when it extends no further than to thoſe 'more general principles, but to ſtifle reaſon, 'and inflame the paſſions? But the propagation 'of Chriſtian truths indiſpenſably requires the aid 'of reaſon, and requires no other human aid [z].'

HERE, again, you are quite ſcandalized at the Biſhop's paradoxical aſſertions concerning the *nature* and *end* of eloquence; and you differ as widely from him now he argues on the ſuppoſition of there being *ſome more ſubſtantial principles of eloquence*, as you did before, when he contended that *moſt* of thoſe, we call principles, were arbitrary and capricious things. You even go ſo far, as to inſult him with a ſtring of queſtions, addreſſed *ad hominem:* for, having quoted ſome paſſages from his book, truly eloquent and rhetorical, you think you have him at advantage, and can now confute him out of his own mouth.

"CAN any thing, you aſk, be more brilliant, "more enlivened, more truly rhetorical, than "theſe paſſages? What then are we to think of "the writer and his intentions? Is he really "ſincere in his reaſoning? or are theſe eloquent "forms of ſpeech ſo many marks of falſhood?

[z] *Doctrine of Grace*, p. 56, 57.

"Were they aſſumed as *a ſuccedaneum to conſcious* "*perſuaſion?* And is the end and deſign of them "to *ſtifle reaſon and inflame the paſſions* [*a*]?"

To blunt the edge of theſe ſharp and preſſing interrogatories, give me leave to obſerve that the main queſtion, agitated by the Biſhop, is, whether divine inſpiration can be reaſonably expected to extend ſo far as to infuſe a perfect model of eloquence, and to over-rule the inſpired Apoſtles in ſuch ſort as that all they write or ſpeak ſhould be according to the rules of the moſt conſummate rhetoric. He reſolves this queſtion, in the *negative: firſt*, by ſhewing that there is no ſuch thing as what would be deemed a perfect model of eloquence ſubſiſting in nature, a great part of what is called Eloquence in all nations, being arbitrary and chimerical; and, *ſecondly*, by ſhewing that even thoſe principles, which may be juſtly thought more ſubſtantial, were, for certain reaſons, not deſerving the ſollicitous and over-ruling care of a divine inſpirer. His reaſons are theſe: *Firſt*, that eloquence, when moſt genuin, *is but a perſuaſive turn given to the elocution to ſupply that inward, that conſcious perſuaſion of the ſpeaker, ſo neceſſary to gain a fair hearing, and which the firſt preachers of the Goſpel*

[*a*] Diſſert. p. 20.

had

had already by the influence and impreſſion of the holy ſpirit upon their minds: And, *next*, that *the end of eloquence, even when it extends no further than to thoſe more general principles, is but to ſtifle reaſon and inflame the paſſions*; an *end*, of a ſuſpicious ſort, and which the propagation of Chriſtian truths, the proper buſineſs of the ſacred writers or ſpeakers, did not require.

You ſee theſe *Reaſons*, in whatever defective, are both of them founded in *one common* principle, which the Biſhop every where goes upon, and the beſt philoſophy warrants, That, when the Deity interpoſes in human affairs, he interpoſes no further than is *neceſſary* to the end in view, and leaves every thing elſe to the intervention and operation of ſecond cauſes. The Apoſtles wanted NO ſuccedaneum to an inward conſcious perſuaſion, which the obſervance of the general principles of eloquence ſupplies: they were not, therefore, ſupernaturally inſtructed in them. They wanted NO aſſiſtance from a power, that tends *to ſtifle reaſon and inflame the paſſions*: it was not, therefore, miraculouſly imparted to them. Every thing, here, is rational and cloſely argued. What was not neceſſary, was not done. Not a word about the inconvenience and inutility, in all caſes, of recurring to the rules and

practice of a chaſt eloquence: not a word to ſhew, that, where eloquence is employed, there is nothing but fraud and *falſehood*, no inward perſuaſion, no conſciouſneſs of truth: not a word to inſinuate, that either you or the Biſhop ſhould be reſtrained from being as eloquent, on occaſion, as you might have it in your power to be, or might think fit: nay, not a word, againſt the Apoſtles themſelves having recourſe to the aids of human eloquence, if they had acceſs to them, and found them expedient; only theſe aids were not REQUIRED, that is, were not to be claimed or expected from divine inſpiration.

THUS ſtands the Biſhop's reaſoning, perfectly clear and juſt. The only room for debate, is, whether his ideas of the *nature*, and *end* of eloquence be juſt, too. *Eloquence*, he ſays, *is but a perſuaſive turn given to the elocution to ſupply that inward, that conſcious perſuaſion of the ſpeaker, ſo neceſſary to gain a fair hearing.* The general affirmation you do not, indeed cannot, reject or controvert; for the great maſter of eloquence himſelf confirms it in expreſs words—*Tum optimè dicit orator, cum* VIDETUR *vera dicere.* QUINCTIL. l. iv. c. 2. And, again, *Semper ita dicat,* TANQUAM *de causâ optimè ſentiat.* l. v. c. 13. that is, an inward conſcious perſuaſion is to be ſupplied by

by the ſpeaker's art. The Biſhop's idea then of the *nature* of eloquence is, as far as I can ſee, the very ſame idea, which QUINCTILIAN had of it. Both agree, that eloquence is *ſuch a turn of the elocution as ſupplies that inward conſcious perſuaſion, ſo neceſſary to the ſpeaker's ſucceſs.* The Biſhop adds, that this *ſupply* the inſpired writers did not want. But you will ſay, perhaps, that merely human writers may have this *inward conſcious perſuaſion*, as well as the inſpired. What then? if human writers can do without this ſuccedaneum, which human eloquence ſupplies to inward perſuaſion, who obliges them to have recourſe to it? Yes, but they cannot do *ſo well* without it. Who then forbids them to have recourſe to it? For neither are the inſpired writers barred of this privilege: only, as being ſimply UNNECESSARY, it was not præternaturally ſupplied. Your perplexity on this ſubject ariſes from not diſtinguiſhing between what is *abſolutely neceſſary*, and what is *ſometimes expedient:* Divine inſpiration provides only for the *firſt*; the *latter* conſideration belongs to human prudence.

BUT it is, further, a miſtake to ſay, *that merely human writers have their inward conſcious perſuaſion as well as the divine.* They may have it, indeed, from the concluſions of their own reaſon,

but have they it in the ſame degree of ſtrength and vivacity, have they the ſame *full aſſurance of faith*, as thoſe who have truth immediately impreſſed upon them by the hand of GOD? I ſuppoſe, not.

BUT the Biſhop's idea of the END of eloquence, revolts you as much as his idea, of its *nature*. *What*, ſays he, *is the* END *of eloquence, even when it extends no further than to thoſe more general principles, but to ſtifle reaſon and inflame the paſſions?* And what other end, I pray you, can it have? You will ſay, To adorn, recommend, and enforce truth. It may be ſo, ſometimes: this, we will ſay, is its more legitimate end. But even this end is not accompliſhed but by *ſtifling reaſon and inflaming the paſſions:* that is, eloquence prevents Reaſon from adverting *ſimply* to the truth of things, and to the force of evidence; and it does this by agitating and diſturbing the natural and calm ſtate of the mind with rhetorical *diminutions or amplifications*. VIS *oratoris* OMNIS, ſays QUINCTILIAN, *in* AUGENDO MINUENDOQUE *conſiſtit*. [l. viii. c. 3. ſub fin.] Now what is this but *ſtifling reaſon?* But it goes further: it *inflames the paſſions*, the ultimate end it has in view from *ſtifling reaſon*, or putting it off its guard. And for this, again, we have the authority of QUINCTILIAN,

QUINCTILIAN, *affectibus perturbandus et ab intentione auferendus orator. Non enim ſolum oratoris eſt docere, ſed plus eloquentia* CIRCA MOVENDUM *valet.* l. iv. c. 5. Or, would you ſee a paſſage from the great maſter of rhetoric, where his *idea* of this double end of eloquence is given, at once? It follows in theſe words—*Ubi* ANIMIS *judicum* VIS *afferenda eſt, et* AB IPSA VERI CONTEMPLATIONE *abducenda mens,* IBI PROPRIUM ORATORIS OPUS EST, l. vi. c. 2. That is, where the *paſſions are to be inflamed and reaſon ſtifled, there is the proper uſe and employment of the rhetorical art.* So exactly has the Biſhop traced the footſteps of the great maſter, when he gave us his idea of the END of eloquence!

WELL but this *end*, you ſay, is IMMORAL. So much the worſe for your ſyſtem, for ſuch is the undoubted end of eloquence, even by the confeſſion of its greateſt patrons and advocates themſelves. But what? Is this end immoral, in all caſes? And have you never then heared, *that the paſſions*, as wicked things as they are, *may be ſet on the ſide of truth?* In ſhort, Eloquence, like Ridicule, which is, indeed, no mean part of it, may be either well or ill employed; and though it cannot be truly ſaid, that the end of either is ſimply *immoral*, yet it cannot be denied, that

that what theſe *modes of addreſs* propoſe to themſelves in ALL caſes, is, *to ſtifle reaſon and inflame the paſſions.*

THE Biſhop's idea, then, of the end of eloquence, I preſume, is fairly, and fully juſtified. But your complaint now is, that the Biſhop does not himſelf abide by this idea. For you find a contradiction between what his Lordſhip ſays here—*that the end of eloquence, even when it extends no further than to thoſe more general principles, is but to ſtifle reaſon and inflame the paſſions*, and what he ſays elſewhere—*that the principal end of eloquence, as it is employed in human affairs, is to miſlead reaſon and to cajole the fancy and affections* [*b*]. But theſe propoſitions are perfectly conſiſtent, nor was the *latter* introduced ſo much as for the purpoſe of *qualifying and palliating* any thing that might be deemed offenſive in the *former*. For though eloquence, chaſtely employed, goes no further than to *ſtifle reaſon and inflame the paſſions* (and the chaſteſt eloquence, if it deſerves the name, goes thus far), yet *the principal end of eloquence, as it is employed in human affairs*, is to *miſlead* reaſon, which is ſomething more than *ſtifling* it; and to *cajole*, which is much worſe than to *inflame*, the paſſions. Reaſon may be STIFLED, and

[*b*] Diſſert. p. 80. n.

the paſſions INFLAMED, when the ſpeaker's purpoſe is to inculcate *right and truth*: Reaſon is only in danger of being MISLED, and the fancy and affections of being CAJOLED, when wrong and error are enforced by him. So very inaccurate was your conception of the Biſhop's expreſſion! which I ſhould not have explained ſo minutely, but to ſhew you that, when you undertook to expoſe ſuch a writer, as the Biſhop, you ſhould have ſtudied his expreſſion with more care, and ſhould have underſtood the force of words at another rate, than you ſeem to have done in this inſtance.

STILL you will aſk, if the *end* be ſo legitimate, why ſhould not the inſpired writers be truſted with this powerful engine of human eloquence? The Biſhop gives ſeveral reaſons: It is a *ſuſpicious inſtrument*, p. 57. It was an *improper* inſtrument for heaven-directed men, whoſe ſtrength was not to be derived from *the wiſdom of men*, but from *the power of God*, p. 59. But the direct and immediate anſwer is contained, as I obſerved, in theſe words—*The propagation of Chriſtian truths indiſpenſably requires the aid of reaſon, and requires no other aid.* 1. Chriſtianity, which is *a reaſonable ſervice*, was of neceſſity to be propagated by force of reaſon; in the Biſhop's better expreſſion,

expreſſion, IT INDISPENSABLY REQUIRED THE AID OF REASON; but *Reaſon*, he tells us in the next words, *can never be fairly and vigorouſly exerted but in that favourable interval which precedes the appeal to the paſſions.* 2. The propagation of Chriſtianity, which indiſpenſably required the aid of reaſon, REQUIRED NO OTHER HUMAN AID: that is, no other human means were ſimply REQUISITE OR NECESSARY. God, therefore, was pleaſed to leave his inſpired ſervants to the prudential uſe and exerciſe of their own natural or acquired talents; but would not ſupernaturally endow them with this *unneceſſary* power of eloquent words. The inſpired writers, even the moſt learned and, by nature, the moſt eloquent of them, made a very ſparing uſe of ſuch talents, *proudly ſacrificing them*, as the Biſhop nobly and eloquently ſays, *to the glory of the everlaſting Goſpel.* But as the *end* was not, ſo neither was the *uſe* of eloquence, ſimply immoral or evil in itſelf. They were conſiderations of *propriety*, *prudence*, and *piety*, which reſtrained the Apoſtles generally, but not always, in the uſe of eloquence; which was leſs *decent* in their caſe, and which they could very well do without. When the ſame conſiderations prompt other men, under other circumſtances, to affect the way of eloquence, it may ſafely, and even commendably,

for

for any thing the Biſhop has ſaid on this ſubject as it concerns divine inſpiration, be employed.

ADMITTING then the Biſhop's ideas both of the *nature* and *end* of eloquence, the *want* of this character in the ſacred writings is only vindicated, not *the thing itſelf* interdicted or diſgraced.

THE concluſion from the whole of what the Biſhop has advanced on this argument, follows in theſe words:

'WHAT, therefore, do our ideas of fit and 'right tell us is required in the *ſtyle* of an uni- 'verſal law? Certainly no more than this—To 'employ thoſe aids which are common to *all* 'language as ſuch; and to reject what is pecu- 'liar to *each*, as they are caſually circumſtanced. 'And what are theſe aids but CLEARNESS and 'PRECISION? By theſe, the mind and ſentiments 'of the Compoſer are intelligibly conveyed to 'the reader. Theſe qualities are eſſential to 'language, as it is diſtinguiſhed from jargon: 'they are eternally the ſame, and independent on 'cuſtom or faſhion. To give a language *clear-* '*neſs* was the office of Philoſophy; to give it '*preciſion* was the office of Grammar. Definition 'performs the firſt ſervice by a reſolution of the

'ideas

'ideas which make up the terms: Syntaxis per-
'forms the ſecond by a combination of the ſe-
'veral parts of ſpeech into a ſyſtematic con-
'gruity: theſe are the very things in language
'which are leaſt poſitive, as being conducted on
'the principles of metaphyſics and logic. Where-
'as, all beſides, from the very power of the ele-
'ments, and ſignification of the terms, to the
'tropes and figures of compoſition, are arbitrary;
'and, what is more, as theſe are a deviation from
'thoſe principles of metaphyſics and logic, they
'are frequently vicious. This, the great maſter
'quoted above [QUINCTILIAN] freely confeſſeth,
'where ſpeaking of that ornamented ſpeech,
'which he calls σχήματα λέξεως, he makes the fol-
'lowing confeſſion and apology—eſſet enim
'omne ſchema VITIUM, ſi non peteretur, ſed ac-
'cideret. Verum auctoritate, vetuſtate, conſue-
'tudine, plerumque defenditur, ſæpe etiam RA-
'TIONE QUADAM. Ideoque cum ſit a ſimplici
'rectoque loquendi genere deflexa, *virtus* eſt, ſi
'habet PROBABILE ALIQUID quod ſequatur [*c*].'

THERE is no part of your book in which you exult more than in the confutation of this obnoxious paragraph. It is to be hoped, you do

[*c*] *Doctrine of Grace*, p. 58.

it

it on good grounds — but let us ſee what thoſe grounds are.

THE Biſhop, in the paragraph you criticize in your v^th^ Chapter, had ſaid *that tropes and figures of compoſition*, under certain circumſtances, there expreſſed, are frequently *vicious*. You make a difficulty of underſtanding this term, and doubt whether his Lordſhip means *vice* in a *critical*, or *moral* ſenſe. I take upon me to anſwer roundly for the Biſhop, that he meant *vice*, in the *critical* ſenſe: for he pronounces ſuch tropes and figures *vicious*, ONLY *as they are a deviation from the principles of* METAPHYSICS AND LOGIC; and therefore I preſume he could not mean *vice* in the other ſenſe, which is *a deviation from the principles of* ETHICS. All you ſay on this ſubject, then, might have been well ſpared.

THIS incidental queſtion, or doubt of your's, being cleared up, let us now attend to the *more ſubſtantial grounds* you go upon, in your cenſure of the learned Biſhop.

HE had been ſpeaking of *clearneſs* and *preciſion*, *as the things in language, which are leaſt poſitive. Whereas, all beſides, from the very power of the elements and ſignification of the terms, to the tropes and*

and figures of compoſition, are arbitrary; and, what is more, as theſe are a deviation from the principles of metaphyſics and logic, are frequently vicious.

In *the firſt place*, you ſay, *it were to be wiſhed that his Lordſhip had pleaſed to expreſs himſelf with a little more preciſion*—*Want of preciſion* is not, I think, a fault with which the Biſhop's writings are commonly charged; and I wiſh it may not appear in this inſtance, as it did lately in another, that your miſapprehenſion of his argument ariſes from the very *preciſion* of his expreſſion. But in what does this ſuppoſed *want of preciſion* conſiſt? Why, in not qualifying this ſentence, paſſed on *the tropes and figures of Compoſition*, which, from the general terms, in which it is delivered, falls indiſcriminately upon ALL writers and ſpeakers; for that "ALL men, who have "ever written and ſpoken, have *frequently* uſed "this mode of elocution, which is ſaid to be "*frequently* vicious [*d*]." Well, but from the word, *frequently*, which you make yourſelf ſo pleaſant with, it appears that the Biſhop *had* qualified *this bold and dangerous poſition*.—Yes, but this makes the poſition *ſtill more bold*. Indeed! The Biſhop is then ſingularly unhappy, to have his poſition, *firſt*, declared bold for want

[*d*] Diſſert. p. 24.

of

of being qualified, and, *then*, bolder ſtill, for being ſo. But your reaſon follows.

"WHAT makes this poſition ſtill more hardy "is, that, however the concluſion ſeems confined "and reſtrained by the addition of that qualify- "ing word [frequently], yet the premiſes are "general and unlimited. It is aſſerted without "any reſtriction, that figurative compoſition is "a deviation from the principles of metaphyſics "and logic. If then it be vicious *as* it is, i. e. "*becauſe* [*quatenus*] it is ſuch a deviation, it muſt "be not only *frequently* but *always* vicious; a "very ſevere cenſure denounced againſt almoſt "every ſpeaker, and every writer, both ſacred "and prophane, that ever appeared in the "world [*e*]."

HERE your criticiſm grows very logical; and, notwithſtanding the confidence I owned myſelf to have in the *preciſion* of the Biſhop's ſtyle, I begin to be in pain how I ſhall diſengage him from ſo exact and philoſophical an objector. Yet, as the occaſion calls upon me, I ſhall try what may be done. *As theſe* [tropes and figures of compoſition] *are a deviation from the principles of metaphyſics and logic, they are frequently* VICIOUS. Since the *Attribute* of this propoſition is ſo peculiarly offenſive to you, your firſt care, methinks,

[*e*] Diſſert. p. 25.

ſhould have been to gain preciſe and exact ideas of the *ſubject*; without which it is not poſſible to judge, whether what is affirmed of it be exceptionable, or no.

By *tropes and figures of compoſition*, you ſeem to underſtand *metaphors*, *allegories*, *ſimilitudes*, and whatever elſe is vulgarly known under the name of *figures of ſpeech*. For in p. 27, you ſpeak of *Allegories, Metaphors and* OTHER *tropes and figures, which, you ſay, are no more than compariſons and ſimilitudes expreſſed in another form*: And your concern, throughout this whole chapter, is for the vindication of *ſuch tropes and figures* from the ſuppoſed charge of their being *a deviation from the principles of metaphyſics and logic*. But now, on the other hand, I dare be confident that the Biſhop meant theſe terms, not in this *ſpecific*, but in their *generic* ſenſe, as expreſſing any kind of change, deflexion, or deviation from the plain and common forms of language. I ſay, I am *confident* of this, 1. becauſe the preciſe ſenſe of the words *is* ſuch as I repreſent it to be; and I have obſerved, though, it ſeems, you have not, that the Biſhop is of all others the moſt *preciſe* in his expreſſion. 2. Becauſe QUINCTILIAN authorizes this uſe of thoſe terms, who tells us that—*per tropos verti formas non verborum modo, ſed et ſenſuum, et compoſitionis*, l. viii. c. 6. And as to *figuram*,

figuram, he defines it to be (as the word itſelf, he ſays, imports) *conformatio quædam orationis, remota à communi et primum ſe offerente ratione*, l. ix. c. 1. *words*, large enough to take in every poſſible change and alteration of common language. So that *all manners and forms* of language, different from the common ones, may, according to QUINCTILIAN, be fitly denominated *tropes and figures of compoſition*. 3. I conclude this to be the Biſhop's meaning, becauſe the *ſpecific ſenſe* of theſe words was not ſufficient to his purpoſe, which was to ſpeak of ALL kinds of tropical and figured ſpeech. Now though *allegories, metaphors and other tropes and figures, which are no more than compariſons and ſimilitudes, expreſſed in another form*, belong indeed to the *genus* of figured language, they are by no means the whole of it, as ſo great a maſter of rhetoric, as yourſelf, very well knows. 4. I conclude this, from the *peculiar mode* of his expreſſion: if the Biſhop had ſaid ſimply *tropes and figures of ſpeech*, I might perhaps (if nothing elſe had hindered) have taken him to mean, as you ſeem to have done, only *metaphors, allegories, and other tropes and figures, expreſſing, in another form, compariſons and ſimilitudes*, which, in vulgar uſe, come under the name of *tropes and figures of ſpeech*: But when he departs from that common form of expreſſion

and puts it, *tropes and figures of* COMPOSITION, I infer that ſo exact a writer, as the Biſhop, had his reaſons for this change, and that he intended by it to expreſs *more* than *tropes and figures of ſpeech* uſually convey, indeed ALL that can any way relate to the tropical and figurative uſe of words in *literary compoſition.*

IT is now ſeen what the SUBJECT of this bold propoſition is: namely, *tropical or figured language, in general.* This figured language, as it is a deviation from the principles of metaphyſics and logic, is frequently *vicious*; i. e. is an acknowledged vice or fault in compoſition, as ſuch. We now then ſee the force of the PREDICATE.

WELL; but if this figured language "be vi-"cious *as* it is, *i. e. becauſe, quatenus*, it is ſuch a "deviation, it muſt not only be *frequently*, but "*always* vicious." The premiſes are general and unlimited: ſo muſt, likewiſe, be the concluſion. What ſenſe, then, is there in the word, *frequently?* or what room, for that qualification?

SIR, what it is to be a great proficient in logic, before one has well learnt one's Grammar! As, i. e. *becauſe, quatenus*, ſay you. How exactly and critically the Engliſh language may be ſtudied in *Dublin*, I pretend not to ſay: But we in *England* underſtand the particle *as*, not only

only in the ſenſe of *becauſe*, *quatenus*, but alſo, and, I think, more frequently, in the ſenſe of *in proportion as*, *according as*, or, if you will needs have a Latin term to explain an Engliſh term, *prout*, *perinde ac*. So that the propoſition ſtands thus: *Theſe tropes and figures*, ACCORDING AS *they are a deviation from the principles of metaphyſic and logic, are frequently vicious.* The premiſes, you now ſee, are qualified, as well as the concluſion. Figured language, WHEN it deviates from the principles of metaphyſics and logic, becomes vicious. Figured language is then—what? *always* vicious? But the Biſhop did not ſay, that figured language is *always* a deviation from thoſe principles. He only ſays, *when* it ſo deviates, it is vicious. It is implied in the expreſſion that figured language at leaſt *ſometimes* deviates from thoſe principles, and the Biſhop, as appears, is of opinion that it *frequently* deviates: He therefore ſays, conſiſtently with his premiſes, and with his uſual accuracy, It is *frequently* vicious.

IN ſhort, the Biſhop's argument, about which you make ſuch a ſtir, if drawn out in mood and figure, would, I ſuppoſe, ſtand thus—"Tropi-"cal and figured language, WHEN it deviates "from the principles of metaphyſics and logic, "is vicious—Tropical and figured language "FREQUENTLY deviates from thoſe principles—

"Therefore tropical and figured language is "FREQUENTLY vicious." And where is the defect of ſenſe or logic, I want to know, in this argumentation? But you impatiently aſk, Are *metaphors, allegories, and compariſons* then included in this *figured language*, which is pronouncd *vicious?* To this queſtion I can only reply, That I know not whether *metaphors, allegories, and compariſons*, are, in the Biſhop's opinion, *deviations* from the principles of metaphyſics and logic: for I cannot find that he ſays any thing, in *particular*, of this kind of tropes and figures. But if you, or any one for you, will ſhew clearly, that *metaphors, allegories, and compariſons* are ſuch *deviations*, the Biſhop, for any thing I know, might affirm, and might be juſtified in affirming, that they were in themſelves *vicious*. But be not too much alarmed for your favourites, if he ſhould: They would certainly keep their ground, though convicted of ſuch *vice*; at leaſt unleſs the Rhetoricians of our time ſhould be ſo dull as not to be able to find out what QUINCTILIAN calls *probabile aliquid*, ſome probable pretext to juſtify or excuſe them.

BUT, inſtead of troubling ourſelves to gueſs what the Biſhop *might* ſay on a ſubject on which he has ſaid nothing, it is to better purpoſe to attend to what he *has* ſaid, on the ſubject in queſtion.

queſtion. The Biſhop *has* ſaid, *That tropical and figured language is frequently vicious.* You aſk when? He replies, *When it deviates from the principles of metaphyſics and logic.* But in what particular inſtances does this appear? He tells you this too. He gives you inſtances enough, to juſtify his affirmation, that tropical and figured language is *frequently* vicious; for he exemplifies his affirmation in ONE WHOLE claſs of ſuch figured ſpeech, as deviates from the principles of metaphyſics and logic, and is therefore vicious, namely, *in the claſs of verbal figures.* 'This, '[*i. e.* the truth of the affirmation, That figured 'language, according as it is found to be a de-'viation from the principles of metaphyſics and 'logic, is frequently vicious] the great maſter, 'QUINCTILIAN, freely confeſſeth, where, ſpeak-'ing of that ornamented ſpeech, which he calls 'σχήματα λέξεως, he makes the following con-'feſſion and apology—eſſet enim omne ſchema 'VITIUM, ſi non peteretur, ſed accideret. Verum 'auctoritate, vetuſtate, conſuetudine, plerumque 'defenditur, ſæpe etiam RATIONE QUADAM. 'Ideoque cum ſit a ſimplici rectoque loquendi 'genere deflexa, *virtus* eſt, ſi habet PROBABILE 'ALIQUID quod ſequatur [*f*].

THE difficulty, I truſt, now begins to clear up. Figured language, is frequently vicious.

[*f*] QUINCT. l. ix. c. 3.

Of this we have an inſtance given in one entire ſpecies of figured or ornamented ſpeech, namely σχήματα λέξεως, or *verbal figures*. Can any thing be clearer and plainer? Yet, becauſe you had taken it into your head that by *tropes and figures of compoſition* the Biſhop underſtood, nay could only underſtand, *metaphors, allegories, and compariſons*, you dreamt of nothing, here, but the ſame fine things. And though QUINCTILIAN lay before the Biſhop, when he quoted theſe words, though the Biſhop's own expreſs words ſhew the contrary, for he ſpeaks not of tropes and figures in general, much leſs of ſuch tropes and figures as you ſpeak of, but ſolely of *that ornamented ſpeech*, called σχήματα λέξεως, you will needs have him quote QUINCTILIAN in this place as ſpeaking of *Rhetorical figures*. But let us attend to QUINCTILIAN's words. *Eſſet omne ſchema vitium, ſi non peteretur, ſed accideret.* What! Shall we think the Biſhop could mean to affirm of *rhetorical figures*, that they would *always be vicious*, if they *were not ſought for, but occurred of themſelves*? For that, I think, is the tranſlation of—*ſi non peterentur, ſed acciderent.* Surely one way, and that the chief, in which *rhetorical figures, metaphors, allegories, and compariſons*, become vicious, is, when they ARE *ſought for, ſollicitouſly hunted after, and affectedly brought in.* The very contrary happens with regard to theſe verbal figures:

they

they are vicious, when they *are* NOT *ſought for and purpoſely affected.* I conclude then, that his Lordſhip, who ſurely does not want common ſenſe, and, I think, underſtands Latin, did not, and could not intend to exemplify his obſervation in the caſe of *rhetorical figures.*

STILL you are ſomething puzzled and perplexed by the Biſhop's obſervation. Admitting him to mean, as his author does, *verbal figures*, how can theſe be conſidered *as a deviation from the principles of metaphyſics and logic?* How? Why, has not the Biſhop told us, or, if he had not, is it not certain in itſelf, than *to give a language clearneſs is the office of philoſophy; and that Definition, a part of Logic, performs that ſervice by a reſolution of the ideas, which make up the terms?* But theſe verbal figures are often a deviation from, nay a willful defiance of, *all logical definition.* Witneſs the very inſtance you and QUINCTILIAN give us, in VIRGIL's *timidi damæ.* Logic defines *Damæ* to be the *females* of that ſpecies of animals, called *Deer.* The figurative VIRGIL confounds this diſtinction by uſing this term for the *males*, as well as females. But, univerſally, *Grammar* itſelf, whoſe peculiar office is to *give preciſion to language*, is a part of logic: the Biſhop ſays, *its rules are conducted on the principles of Logic.* But *verbal figures*, even when they do not offend againſt the ſtrictneſs of definition, are

univerſally violations, in ſome degree or other, of *Grammar*, i. e. of *Logic*. Yet theſe violations of *Logical Grammar*, QUINCTILIAN tells us, may be allowed, *ſi habent probabile aliquid quod ſequantur*; that is, for ſome fantaſtical reaſon or other, by which the maſters of Rhetoric are pleaſed to recommend them to us.

AND now, Sir, let me aſk, what becomes of your fine comment on QUINCTILIAN's chapter concerning *verbal figures*, and, particularly, of your nice diſtinction between theſe, and *rhetorical figures*, which the Biſhop, no doubt, wanted to be informed of? The iſſue of your exploits in Logic and Criticiſm is now ſeen to be this, That you have groſsly miſrepreſented the Biſhop; and needleſsly, at leaſt, explained QUINCTILIAN. *Firſt*, you make the Biſhop talk of *rhetorical figures* ONLY, in the *ſpecific* ſenſe of theſe terms, when his Lordſhip was all the while ſpeaking of *figured language, in general*. *Next*, you make him deliver a bold poſition concerning rhetorical figures, as being *frequently* vicious, becauſe *always* deviations from the principles of metaphyſics and logic; when all he maintains, is, That figured language is FREQUENTLY vicious, according as it deviates from thoſe principles; and, in particular, that *that* part of figured ſpeech, called grammatical or verbal figures, is ALWAYS vicious.

To

To conclude, if you had ſhewn any compunction, or even common reſpect in expoſing what you took to be the Biſhop's abſurdities on this ſubject, I ſhould have made a conſcience of laying you open on this head of *Rhetorical and Grammatical figures*. As it is, your unmerciful triumph over the poor Biſhop makes it allowable for me to lay your dealing with him before the reader in all its nakedneſs; and, after what has been ſaid, I cannot do it better than by letting him ſee how the Biſhop's argumentation is repreſented by you, as drawn out in your own words, and that in full mood and figure.

"I SHOULD by no means, ſay you, willingly "miſrepreſent the argument of my Lord Biſhop; "but upon repeated examination of the paſſage "here quoted, I muſt ſtate it thus:

"QUINCTILIAN declares, that what are called "grammatical figures are really no more than "faulty violations of grammatical rules, unleſs "when purpoſedly introduced upon ſome reaſon-"able or plauſible grounds."

THEREFORE,

"HE confeſſes that tropes and figures of com-"poſition, as they are a deviation from the prin-"ciples of metaphyſics and logic, are frequent-"ly vicious."

You

You add, "If this be a fair repreſentation, it "were to be wiſhed that the learned author *had* "*ſo far condeſcended to men of confined abilities*, as "to explain the connexion between theſe two "propoſitions [g].

As the *learned author*, I gueſs, may be better employed than in this unneceſſary taſk, which you *wiſh* to impoſe upon him, I have taken upon me to diſcharge that office, with leſs able hands; and, yet, have *explained the connexion between theſe two propoſitions* in ſuch ſort, that, if I miſtake not, we ſhall never hear more from you, of any inconſiſtency between them.

I HAVE NOW, Sir, gone through the ſeveral particulars of your Diſſertation, and have ſhewn, I think, clearly and invincibly, that all your objections to the Biſhop's paradoxical ſentiments on the ſubject of Eloquence are miſtaken and wholly groundleſs.

THE TWO propoſitions, his Lordſhip took upon him to confute, 1. *That an inſpired language muſt needs be a language of perfect eloquence*; and 2. *That eloquence is ſomething congenial and eſſential to human ſpeech, and inherent in the conſtitution of things*: Theſe two propoſitions, I ſay, are ſo thoroughly confuted by the Biſhop, that not one word of all you ſay in any degree affects his rea-

[g] Diſſert. p. 34.

ſoning,

ſoning, or ſupports thoſe two propoſitions againſt the force of it. I am even candid enough to believe that, on further thoughts, you will not yourſelf be diſpleaſed with this ill ſucceſs of your attack on the learned Prelate's *principles*; which are manifeſtly calculated for the ſervice of religion and the honour of inſpired ſcripture. For, though you attempt to ſhew us in your two laſt chapters, how the honour of inſpired ſcripture may be ſaved on *other principles*, yet allow me to ſay that, for certain reaſons, I much queſtion the validity of thoſe principles; at leaſt, that the perſons, moſt concerned in this controverſy, will by no means ſubſcribe to them. If there be an Archetype of eloquence in nature, 'one 'ſhould be apt enough, as the Biſhop ſays, to 'conclude, that when the Author of nature con-'deſcended to inſpire one of theſe plaſtic per-'formances of human art, he would make it by 'the exacteſt pattern of the Archetype [*b*].' Or, whatever you and I and the Biſhop might conclude, aſſure yourſelf that the objectors to inſpired ſcripture will infallibly draw that concluſion. And, when they do ſo, and fortify themſelves, beſides, with the authority of ſo great a maſter of eloquence, as yourſelf, it will be in vain, I doubt, to oppoſe to them your ingenious harangues and encomiums on the eloquent compoſition of the ſacred ſcriptures. Nay, it would

[*b*] *Doctrine of Grace*, p. 52.

give

give you, no doubt, ſome pain to find that, though they ſhould accept your authority for the truth of their favourite principle of there being *an Archetype in nature of perfect eloquence*, they would yet reject your *harangues and encomiums* with that diſdain, which is ſo natural to them. The honour of ſacred ſcripture will then hang on a queſtion of *Taſte:* and unluckily the objectors are of ſuch authority in that reſpect, that there is no appeal from their deciſions of it.

THE contemplation of theſe *inconveniences*, together with the *love of truth*, determined me to hazard this addreſs to you. I will not deny, beſides, that the mere *juſtice* due to a great character, whom I found ſomewhat freely, not to ſay injuriouſly treated by you, was, alſo, *one* motive with me. If I add ſtill *another*, it is ſuch as I need not diſown, and which you, of all men, will be the laſt to object to, I mean a motive of *Charity* towards yourſelf.

I AM much a ſtranger to your perſon, and, what it may perhaps be ſcarce decent for me to profeſs to you, even to your writings. All I know of YOURSELF, is, what your book tells me, that you are diſtinguiſhed by an honourable place and office in the Univerſity of *Dublin:* and what I have heared of your WRITINGS, makes me think favourably of a private ſcholar, who,

they

they ſay, employs himſelf in ſuch works of learning and taſte, as are proper to inſtill a reverence into young minds for the beſt models of antient eloquence. While you are thus creditably ſtationed, and thus uſefully employed, I could not but feel ſome concern for the hurt you were likely to do yourſelf by engaging in ſo warm and ſo unneceſſary an oppoſition to a *writer*, as you characterize him, *of diſtinguiſhed eminence* [*i*]. Time was, when even with us on this ſide the water, the novelty of this writer's poſitions, and the envy, which ever attends ſuperior merit, diſpoſed ſome warm perſons to open, and proſecute with many hard words, the unpopular cry againſt him, of his being a bold and PARADOXICAL writer. But reflexion and experience have quieted this alarm. Men of ſenſe and judgment now conſider his Paradoxes as very harmleſs, nay as very ſober and certain truths; and even vye with each other in their zeal of building upon them, as the ſureſt baſis, on which a juſt and rational vindication of our common religion can be raiſed. This is the preſent ſtate of things with us, and eſpecially, they ſay, in the Univerſities of this kingdom.

IT was, therefore, not without ſome ſurprize, and, as I ſaid, with much real concern, that I found

[*i*] Adv. to the Diſſert.

a gentleman of learning and education revive, at ſuch a juncture, that ſtale and worn-out topic, and diſgrace himſelf by propagating this clamour, of I know not what *paradoxical boldneſs*, now long out of date, in the much-approved writings of this great Prelate. Nor was the diſhonour to yourſelf, the only circumſtance to be lamented. You were ſtriving, with all your might, to infuſe prejudices into the minds of many ingenious and virtuous young men; whom you would ſurely be ſorry to miſlead; and who would owe you little thanks for prepoſſeſſing them with unfavourable ſentiments of ſuch a man and writer, as the Biſhop of *Glouceſter*, they will find, is generally eſteemed to be.

THESE, then, were the conſiderations, which induced me to employ an hour or two of leiſure in giving your book a free examination. I have done it in as few words as poſſible, and in a *manner* which no reaſonable and candid man, I perſuade myſelf, will diſapprove. I know what apologies may be requiſite to the learned Biſhop for a ſtranger's engaging in this officious talk. But to you, Sir, I make none: It is enough if any benefits to yourſelf or others may be derived from it.

I am, with reſpect, &c.

THE END.